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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
be applied in an "after-the-fact" fashion merely to rationalize or describe a
court's denial of federal habeas corpus. Waiver should be confined to the
role of a judicial shortcut when exercised by a defendant before he is
required to assert the federal right which he intends to "waive."
In conclusion, it might be asked just what are the present limitations
on the writ when used by state prisoners. Also what facts, if changed,
would have persuaded the Court to reach a different result? Viewing the
case realistically, it is evident that simple solutions to these and related
questions will not be found easily. Habeas corpus is very likely to remain
an "untidy area of our law" for years to come. One observation which
can be made, however, is that the Fay decision reflects a trend by which
the Supreme Court, with increasing frequency, has searched for and dis-
covered defects in state court proceedings which are in violation of a
defendant's constitutional rights. And perhaps as our concept of due
process continues to acquire broader meaning, the flexibility of habeas
corpus will correspondingly expandYT The writ is largely a barometer of
our contemporary notions of justice and fairness. In the future, federal
habeas corpus will permit federal courts to correct injustices and achieve
those same results which direct appellate review cannot remedy. Perhaps
this trend by the Supreme Court to bring state criminal proceedings more
and more within the protection of the Federal Bill of Rights is what makes
the protection of civil liberties, through habeas corpus, important.
Thomas M. Twardowski
SALES - IMPLIED WARRANTY - FINAL PARTS ASSEMBLER BUT NOT
PARTS MANUFACTURER LIABLE FOR DEATH OF PASSENGER IN
AIRPLANE CRASH.
Goldberg v. Kolisman Instrument Corp. (N.Y. 1963)
Plaintiff, administratrix of the estate of the deceased, brought this
action against American Airlines, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and
Kollsman Instrument Corporation, for the wrongful death of the deceased
in an airplane crash. The complaint against American Airlines was based
on negligence, while that against the latter two companies was for breach
of implied warranty. Lockheed had assembled the aircraft; Kollsman man-
ufactured the altimeter which apparently caused the accident. However,
both lacked a privity relationship with the deceased, a passenger.
37. Brennan, supra note 15, at 440.
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Using this absence of privity as a basis for its ruling, the Supreme
Court dismissed the complaint against both Lockheed and Kollsman,' and
the Appellate Division affirmed. 2 The Court of Appeals, by a four to three
margin, reversed these decisions as to Lockheed while affirming as to
Kollsman,3 holding that liability for the death of a passenger in an airplane
crash falls on the assembler of the plane's component parts rather than the
manufacturer of the defective part. Goldberg v. Kolisman Instrument Corp.,
12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
New York's struggle against the privity requirement has been a long
and checkered one, beginning, at least, as far back as Thomas v. Win-
chestei"4 and continuing through MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.5 Un-
fortunately, these cases attempted to create exceptions to the privity rule
by using negligence as their line of attack.6 The result was that the injured
party often found himself with massive evidentiary problems which some-
times caused significant injustices.7
Seeking a way out of such difficulties, New York recently turned to
the doctrine of implied warranty to impose what was virtually strict lia-
bility on specific manufacturers in particular situations. In Greenberg v.
Lorenz,8 the limitations on who could bring an action under implied war-
ranty were considerably weakened. A boy sickened by bad fish, which had
been purchased by his father, was permitted to recover against the food
producer despite the lack of privity between victim and manufacturer.
Although the actual holding of the court cautiously limited the food pur-
chaser to being a member of the same household as the stricken party, a
majority of the court left little doubt that they would extend the area of
recovery for those not in privity much further, if the occasion demanded
it.9
Less than a year later, the same court considered the converse situ-
ation: the extent of implied warranty liability. Randy Knitwear v. Amer-
ican Cyanamid Co.10 decided that warranties could be expanded into the
manufacturing area." As a result, the purchaser of a chemically treated
1. 23 Misc. 2d 215, 199 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
2. 12 App. Div. 2d 906, 214 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961).
3. Desmond, C.J., wrote the majority opinion with Dye, Fuld, and Foster, JJ.
concurring, while Burke J. dissented with the concurrence of Van Voorhis, and
Scileppi JJ.
4. 6 N.Y. 397 (1850).
5. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
6. See generally, 35 ST. JOHN's L. Rxv. 178 (1959), for a spirited defense of the
New York negligence requirement.
7. See Tiffin v. Great A.&P. Tea Co., 20 Ill. App. 2d 421, 156 N.E.2d 257 (1959);
Sharpe v. Danville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Ill. App. 175, 132 N.E.2d 442 (1956).
In both cases recovery by the plaintiff was precluded because he was unable to
prove that tampering with the product was unlikely after it left defendant's control.
8. 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
9. Several members of the court preferred to preserve at least a facadE of privity
by the use of an implied agency rationale similar to that of Bowman v. Great A.&P.
Tea Co., 308 N.Y. 780, 125 N.E.2d 165 (1955).
10. 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
11. It is ironic and perhaps significant that the court chose this rather detached
area of the clothing industry, instead of one in which the public was more directly
concerned, to impose implied warranty.
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garment was permitted to recover against the manufacturer of the chemical
which had failed to work satisfactorily on the clothing. Four of the judges
stressed that the public advertising involved created a warranty. 12 How-
ever, the remainder of the court, while concurring in the result, refused
to accede to any further extension of the line of liability in such cases.
Instead they clung to what was a rather tenuous privity connection between
the buyer and the manufacturer.'3 Concurrently, the California Supreme
Court decided Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,14 a case which
markedly influenced the instant case. There the court held that one in-
jured by a faulty power tool could recover against its manufacturer on the
basis of strict liability for breach of implied warranty. The decision greatly
emphasized placing the cost of this type of injury on those who market
such products, rather than on those who are injured by them.
In the present decision, the court found itself confronted with an im-
plied warranty which the plaintiff attempted to carry a crucial step further
by the action against the altimeter manufacturer, Kollsman.15 Since ad-
vertising of the type used in the Randy Knitwear case was not employed
here, the thrust of the majority opinion is on protection of the helpless
individual who had been injured. Following California's lead, the court
has attempted to make those who can best afford it pay the cost of offering
a defective product for public use. The difficulty with such a theory is that
it fails to explain why Lockheed, which merely put the defective altimeter
into the plane, is strictly liable to the public for its failure, while Kollsman
is released, even though it manufactured the product.
The answer to this problem may lie in a literal interpretation of the
Greenman case, where the burden of strict liability was cast on those who
put imperfect merchandise before the public. It was Lockheed, through
American Airlines, which made it possible for the deceased to use the
ill-fated plane.16 Thus, it may be argued, that as the final assembler of
the plane, an absolute duty devolved upon Lockheed to see that the com-
ponents were not latently defective. In view of the heavy burden which
implied warranty imposes, there are strong reasons for limiting liability to
as few companies as possible along the chain of production. Unfortunately
the choice of the assembler of the parts to carry this burden may be some-
what arbitrary.' T
12. These same justices thought that liability should be dependent upon the
representation, not upon the character of the product.
13. The concurring justices held that the defendant's labeling of its product estab-
lished privity with the plaintiff.
14. 59 Cal.2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
15. The federal courts had extended implied warranty to the assembler of an
airplane in a similar case, but had not been confronted with an attempt to hold the
manufacturer of the part as well. See Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F.
Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
16. See 44 CORNLL L.Q. 608 (1959), which expounds much the same theory in
the food sales area.
17. With the relative frequence of air crashes it might be wise to distribute
implied warranty among more producers in order to lessen its cost.
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Judge Burke strikes against this seeming arbitrariness in his dissent-
ing opinion. What disturbs him most is that Lockheed did not have the
final word in determining whether its airplane would be used by the public.
This decision instead was made by the Federal Aviation Agency which cer-
tified the plane fit for flight. The dissent argues that since the chance for the
last inspection was taken from Kollsman's hands, giving Lockheed and
Kollsman equal opportunities to inspect, there is no reason why the former
be held to more strict liability than the latter.' 8 A study of the reasons for
government inspections makes clear the flaw in such reasoning. The federal
regulations concerning aviation were promulgated to protect passengers
from injuries, not to protect the manufacturers from lawsuits. It would
hardly be just to turn the government agencies involved against the very
people they were meant to protect.
Obviously the dissenting judges are deeply concerned about the loss
of certainty as to when one should be liable, as well as the loss of uni-
formity concerning who should be held liable both of which have resulted
from the abandonment of privity. However, against these fears the majority
has weighed its overriding concern for the injured party. The victim's right
to recover is now the primary factor in determining the permissibility of
recovery, regardless of any technicalities in the law. There is little doubt
that the majority intends that the line of liability which it has drawn
between the assembler and the manufacturer can be indelible only as long as
the rights of the plaintiff are adequately protected.19 If a later litigant using
implied warranty can show that he must go farther along the chain of pro-
duction in order to recover, then the area of liability will probably be
widened. Such a rule of law may result in a clash with the first discussed
California decision which places the burden on those who put defective
products on the market, rather than on the manufacturer. It is possible to
imagine situations in which New York would have to allow recovery by
a plaintiff against a manufacturer in order to protect the former, while the
California rule of law would not allow such a recovery because the de-
fendant was not engaged in marketing the product.20
Practical protection of the individual such as the majority envisions
may produce illogical and even unfair results. As the dissent points out,
the ruling in the present case apparently leaves the public carrier (American
Airlines) liable to a standard of due care, the assembler (Lockheed)
strictly liable, and the manufacturer (Kollsman) not liable at all, unless
protection of the injured party demands it.21
18. There is a divergence of opinion as to whether the probability of inspection
would relieve liability even with a negligence standard. Compare Carter v. Yardley
& Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946), holding the probability of inspection could
relieve liability, with RESTATUM5NT, ToRrs § 396 (1934).
19. "However, for the present at least we do not think it necessary so to extend
this rule as to hold liable the manufacturer . . . of a component part." (Emphasis
added.) 12 N.Y.2d 432, 435, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963).
20. Consider the possibility of a situation in which the assembler and the marketer
of the product are bankrupt and the manufacturer is solvent.
21. In view of the majority's stated aim of protecting the individual, this seemingly
illogical result may follow perfectly reasonably from the decision.
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It is wise to remember, however, that due to certain pecularities con-
cerning aircraft, the lines drawn here may not extend beyond the bounds
of the airplane industry. Therefore, further consideration is necessary
before boundaries of liability are erected in other areas such as the food
industry.22 In the first place, it is difficult to establish definitely the party
(beyond the assembler) responsible for the crash in question. It is certain
that the plane which Lockheed assembled failed to fly its destined course.
The same amount of certainty does not support the assertion that Kolls-
man's altimeter caused this failure. Although government probes usually
are made of this type of accident, the courts may well feel a reluctance to
fix strict liability according to the results of these investigations. However,
such problems usually, are not present in the food industry, since ample
evidence of the causes of injuries is almost always readily available. It is
not difficult, therefore, to fix definite responsibility (and consequently
impose strict liability) on companies beyond those which merely market
inadequate goods. In other words, failure to base implied warranty on
the mental deductions of government investigators is one thing, while fail-
ure to base implied warranty on the physical evidence of bad food may
well be another.
Another distinctive feature of the airplane industry is the degree of
government control over its carrier's prices. An industry such as this has
a great deal of difficulty in distributing the cost of implied warranties, since
its carriers must obtain approval from the government for any change in
its fares. Thus, while prices will eventually adjust themselves in a free
market industry regardless of how far down the line of production implied
warranty is imposed, this is not necessarily true in a price regulated in-
dustry. In the latter, government commissioners may lose sight of price
increases which are necessary, due to implied warranty, relatively far down
the production line and refuse to permit those persons putting the products
on the market to raise their prices to meet the situation. In the present
case, for instance, a rise in the prices of Lockheed, made necessary by this
decision, could hardly be missed by even the most obtuse government com-
missions. As a result, American Airlines could probably raise its fares.
This would not necessarily be true, however, if Kollsman increased its
prices for the same reason and consequently caused Lockheed to do the
same. It would seem likely, therefore, that industries in the free market
will find themselves responsible for implied warranties regardless of their
remoteness from actual sales, while this may not be the case in industries
under government control. Despite its announced purpose of protecting
the individual, it is hard to believe that the court did not at least consider
these distinctions between various industries. 23
22. One defense which is unlikely to be available in airplane cases, but may be of
use to other businesses, is contributory negligence. 36 So. CALIF. L. Rev. 490 (1963).
23. Both regulated and unregulated industries may be able to avoid liability by
expressly contracting against it with the ultimate purchaser, provided such provisions
are not against public policy. Knecht v. Universal Motor Co., 113 N.W.2d 688 (N.D.
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